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PROPAGATING A LEMON: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT ESTABLISHES RELIGION IN THE
NAME OF NEUTRALITY
ANITA Y. WOUDENBERG*
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional
'signpost' to be followed or ignored in a particular
case as our predilections may dictate. Instead, our
goal should be 'to frame a principle for
constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded
in the history and language of the first amendment,
but one that is also capable of consistent application
to the relevant problems. ' 1
INTRODUCTION
Two displays of the Ten Commandments stand on government
property.2 The first is one among many historical documents on display
inside a state courthouse. The second is a six foot high by three foot
* B.A. with honors, 2001, Psychology, Calvin College; J.D., 2004, Valparaiso
University School of Law. Editor, Valparaiso University Law Review, 2003-2004.
Member, State Bar of Indiana; Associate, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terra Haute,
Indiana.
1. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (citing Jesse Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 332-33 (1963)). Ironically, the test
established by Justice O'Connor-the reasonable observer test-does little more
than provide an ambiguous standard. See generally Julie Van Groningen, Note,
Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on its Context: Analyzing Public Displays of the Ten
Commandments, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 219 (2004) (discussing the inconsistent
applications of the reasonable observer test throughout the circuits). See infra Part
I.C. for a brief explanation of the reasonable observer test.
2. The facts from this scenario are found in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005), and McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
3. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 844.
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wide stone monument with the Decalogue inscribed on it, standing
outside the state capitol building.4 According to the Supreme Court, the
latter is constitutional,5 the former is not.6
On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court, in two plurality decisions,
found that the display inside the county courthouses violated the
Establishment Clause,7 but held that the stone monument standing
8
outside the capitol did not. In arriving at the former decision, the Court
relied upon the alleged purposes behind erecting these displays9 and the
neutrality of such displays'0 to determine whether or not they violated the
First Amendment. However, as this article will demonstrate, the purpose
test and the neutrality test are not properly based upon the Establishment
Clause or Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has fallen far from the
proverbial tree in the last century as it has been molded and remolded to
satisfy the whims of justices rendering result-oriented decisions. As
Justice Thomas rightly pointed out in his concurring opinion in Van
Orden, it is time for the Supreme Court to take a serious look at the
quagmire it has created and to discard the various permutations it has
created for a simpler, cleaner, and clearer approach to interpreting and
applying the Establishment Clause." To that end, this article reviews
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence and offers an appropriate
standard for the Court to adopt. Specifically, Part I reviews the history
of the Establishment Clause, looking at how it was understood at its
ratification,1 2 as well as its modem interpretation and current
4. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677.
5. Id. at 692.
6. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881.
7. Id.
8. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692.
9. MeCreary, 545 U.S. at 859-74.
10. Id. at 874-79.
11. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692-94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 25-47. Reviewing the ratification
process of the First Amendment is critical in understanding what the First
Amendment was, and was not, designed to protect or prevent. Relying upon how the
framers acted subsequent to the Bill of Rights passage is not wholly adequate
because those whose views were not supported or not considered at the passage of
the Bill of Rights may still assert their minority or novel perspective in applying it.
For example, Thomas Jefferson, who was not part of the committee or house debates
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applications. 3 Part II analyzes the Court's recent decisions of McCreary
and Van Orden,4 critiquing the current tests employed for Establishment
Clause analysis.' 5 Finally, Part III advocates narrowing Establishment
Clause analysis to its original parameters and reviewing those issues
inappropriately subjected to Establishment Clause scrutiny under their
proper constitutional provision: free speech.'
6
I. THE LEGAL STATE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become
bedeviled by reliance on formulaic abstractions that
are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our
long-accepted constitutional traditions. 17
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,, The first of these religion
but was instead in France, did not pray Christological prayers as President. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. S. Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174, 174-76 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898). While this is
his perspective of what he should or should not do as President, perhaps because of
Constitutional restraints, perhaps because of his own personal reservations, it should
have no bearing upon whether the Establishment Clause reaches prayers offered by
the President. Likewise, the fact that George Washington was asked by Congress to
offer a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation as President, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 923
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) [Hereinafter ANNALS], should have little bearing upon
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because he was President at the time of the Bill
of Rights passage and, as such, did not participate except, perhaps, at arms length in
the Congressional process of ratifying the Bill of Rights.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 48-129.
14. See sources cited supra note 2.
15. See infra notes 134-231 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
17. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Significantly, "the First Amendment does not ask
[Congress] to refrain from intervening in religious matters"-it commands it
unflinchingly. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 60 (Craig Joyce
ed., 2003). The First Amendment is part of a greater document-the Bill of
Rights-that the framers drafted to "buil[d] a wall around certain fundamental
individual freedoms, forever limiting the majority's ability to intrude upon them."
Id. at 59. At its ratification, the government had little "involvement in education,
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clauses is referred to as the Establishment Clause, the latter as the Free
Exercise Clause.' 9 Both clauses are designed to guarantee religious
freedom in two different manners.2  The Establishment Clause was
designed to separate the government from religion, while the Free
Exercise Clause preserves freedom from coercion in choosing aS• 21
religion.
Focusing on the first of these two clauses, this part traces the
history and development of the Establishment Clause. First, Section A
discusses the original intent of the Establishment Clause at its
22
ratification. Section B explains the modem interpretation of the
23Establishment Clause under Lemon v. Kurtzman. Last, Sections C and
D address further interpretations of the Establishment Clause and the
current use of the Lemon test.
24
A. The Framing and Ratification of the Establishment Clause
James Madison first proposed amending the Constitution as a
25House Representative on June 8, 1789. Among the first amendments
social welfare, or the formation and transmission of culture." Michael W.
McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 21 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
19. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 712 (2004); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1970).
20. See 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 631 (3d ed.
1997).
21. Id. While the purposes of the Establishment Clause are significant, they
should not be given too much credence. But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). The purpose of the Establishment Clause is
relevant in as much as the purposes viewed by the framers are considered. Since its
passage, scholars may view the purpose of the Establishment Clause to be
substantially different-perspectives that may yield significantly disparate results.
The McCreary and Van Orden decisions are recent proof of this problem. See infra
text accompanying notes 100-129. Consequently, it would behoove the Court to
weigh only those purposes and concerns articulated by those who had the ultimate
authority to craft the provision rather than those purposes that they, or other
academicians, advance.
22. See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-132 and accompanying text.
25. ANNALS, supra note 12 at 440-41 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Madison did
not view the passage of a bill of rights to be terribly important. In a letter to Thomas
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was the first draft of the religion clauses, which stated: "the civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.
26
Initially, the House was opposed to the amendments, wishing to focus
instead on other issues at hand.2' However, by the end of the day in
which he raised the issue, Madison convinced the House to take up the
. 28
issue of amending the Constitution.
Jefferson regarding proposing a bill of rights, Madison stated that he did not believe
the bill to be significant for several reasons, the foremost of which was that "the
rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are
granted." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), id. at
477. Further, he did not view the government as a real threat of oppression in
violation of such a bill of rights, but rather, "[w]herever the real power in a
[g]overnment lies, there is the danger of oppression." Id. He believed the real
power was in the majority of the people, and that the majority of people might use
the government as a tool in the hands of such a majority. Id. Because of this, when
George Mason and Elbridge Gerry on September 12, 1787, during the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia, moved for a committee to be created to draft a bill of
rights, the motion was unanimously rejected by all, including Madison and
Washington. R. Carter Pittman, Our Bill of Rights: How It Came to Be,
http://rcarterpittman.org/essays /Bill-ofRights/Our Bill_ofRights.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009). However, Madison ultimately became an advocate for a bill
of rights, "provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included
in the enumeration." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra. He
conceded that "there may be occasions on which ... evil may spring from the
[usurped acts of the Government]." Id.
26. ANNALS, supra note 12, at 434. The bill of rights Madison proposed is
almost verbatim a copy of the bill of rights proposed by Virginia. Pittman, supra
note 25. The Virginia bill of rights was copied almost verbatim from a draft by
George Mason, id., who is considered the "Father of the Bill of Rights." DAVID
BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND RELIGION 23
(2d. ed., 1997). The language proposed by Mason stated that "all men have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no particular sect or society of Christians ought to be
favored or established by law in preference to others." KATE MASON ROWLAND,
THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 244 (1892). Likewise, the preamble of the Declaration
of Independence, which contains similar concepts as those proposed by Madison and
which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson, originated from the writings of George
Mason's original draft, published in newspapers on June 1, 1776. Pittman, supra
note 25.
27. ANNALS, supra note 12, at 441-44,462, 685-91.
28. Id. at 450.
His proposals were referred to a select committee, of which he
29
was a member. On July 28, 1789, the committee reported back to the
House, amending the provision to read: "No religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed. '  During
debate in the House, it was further amended to read: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
nor shall the rights of Conscience be infringed." 31  Although the
language was proposed in this form, some representatives worried that
the amended language might be thought to abolish religion altogether;
32
others thought that a better version would read "no religious doctrine
shall be established by law. 33
After the passage of the House's proposed language, the Senate
began debating its proposal in secret.34 On September 9, 1789, 31 the
Senate successfully amended the proposed language to read: "Congress
shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion," intending to narrow the
amendment to prohibiting Congress only from supporting or endorsing a
36
single denomination or national religion.
29. O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 635.
30. Amendments Reported by the Select Committee, July 28, 1789,
http://www.constitution.orgbor/amdscom.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
31. Amendments Passed by the House of Representatives, August 24, 1789,
http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd-hr.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
32. ANNALS, supra note 12, at 729. Specifically, "[Mr. Sylvester] feared it
might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether." Likewise, "Mr.
Huntington said that ... the words might be taken in such latitude as to be
extremely hurtful to the cause of religion" and that "others might find it convenient
to put another construction upon it." Id. at 730.
33. Id. at 730. Similarly, Madison thought that including the word "national"
before religion would "point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to
prevent." Id. at 24.
34. O'BREN, supra note 20, at 635.
35. Amendments Passed by the Senate, September 9, 1789,
http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd-sen.txt (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
36. O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 635. Three motions to amend the proposed
language failed; the suggested changes included narrowing the amendment to ban
preference of "one religious sect or society," or "any particular denomination of
religion in preference to another." Id. The final, successfully amended language
permitted Congress to provide governmental aid to all religions, provided it was
done in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Id.
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The Senate's changes were met with opposition in the House.37
However, on September 24, 1789, the House decided to accept the
Senate's proposed amendment, provided that it was modified to read as
follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."38 The Senate agreed to
these changes.39 They were adopted on September 25, 1789.40
Those supporting the amendment of the Constitution had several
reasons for preventing the establishment of a religion.41  The framers
were concerned with the power of the religious establishment they
observed in England, which served as a religious "endowment, at the
public expense, in exclusion of or in preference to any other, by giving to
its members exclusive political rights, and by compelling the attendance
of those who rejected its communion upon its worship or religious
. ,,42
observances. The framers did not want to duplicate this scenario by
37. ANNALS, supra note 12, at 948.
38. Id. at 913.
39. Id. at 88.
40. Id. Madison's efforts to prevent states from establishing and restricting
religion and religious practices failed. O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 635. Thus, for
example, Massachusetts continued to deny Jews the right to hold pt~blic office until
1828. Id. The Religion Clauses were not applied to the states until after the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's ruling in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), finding that the free exercise clause was
applicable to the states, and Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), incorporating the Establishment Clause to the states. O'BRIEN, supra
note 20, at 635-36. See infra note 48 for a discussion of the Everson case. Such
incorporation violates the framers' intent because it was specifically amended to be
directed at Congress. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 25. But see generally Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the
States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REv. 551 (1998) (arguing that
the incorporation of the First Amendment to the states was a natural byproduct of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
41. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 90 (2002).
Establishment concerns were often voiced in more generic terms as "freedom of
religion" and "freedom of conscience." Id. at 95.
42. BARTON, supra note 26, at 30-3 1. (quoting The Reports of Committees of
the Senate of the United States for the Second Session of the Thirty-Second
Congress, 1852-53 1, 6, 8-9 (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1854)). The
distinction between the church and state was also important to the framers because
of the religious "two-kingdoms" notion that the kingdom of God is not subject to
earthly, political kingdoms. McConnell, supra note 18, at 10. This notion is
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restraining public religious expression and saw preventing
governmentally-established national denominations as a means of
• 41
ensuring that the federal government never imposed such restraints.
Additionally, while the framers sought to protect religion," they
also wanted to ensure that no establishment privileges existed, such as
ultimately derived from the writings of Saint Augustine. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 477 (Marcus Dods trans., The Modem Library 2000) (1950).
43. BARTON, supra note 26, at 21, 24. Additionally, the framers never
intended the First Amendment to apply to the states as "it was well established that
the States were free to do as they pleased" where the establishment of religion was
concerned. Id. at 24-25. In fact, "virtually all of the Bill of Rights provisions
represent[ed] restraints upon Congress... most of them had been originally intended
to be placed in Article I of the Constitution, with the others intended to be placed in
Article III and VI." GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
49 (1995). Thus, Congress could neither create its own national religious
establishments nor interfere with any state's religious establishments. Id. at 56.
Interestingly, most states' constitutions did not use this reserved power to establish a
state religion. See, e.g., 1818 CONST. OF THE STATE OF CONN. art. 7, § 1 (1818)
("And each and every society or denomination of Christians in this state shall have
and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights, and privileges[.]"); N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 13 (2007) ("All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority
shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience."); N.H.
CONST. art. 6 (2008) ("And every person, denomination or sect shall be equally
under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect, denomination
or persuasion to another shall ever be established[.]"); N.J. CONST. art. I para. 4
("There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no
religious or racial test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public
trust."). However, several of the states that ratified the Bill of Rights had
established churches within their borders. RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE:
REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 163 (2003). The
First Amendment was incorporated to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,
which mandates that states afford its citizens due process and equal protection of the
laws. O'CONNOR, supra note 18, at 59.
44. See, e.g., TEXT OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787, art. III,
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/ordinance/text.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2009) ("Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged." (cited by BARTON, supra note 26, at 41)). In order to gain
admittance to the union, each state was required to adopt the tenets of the Northwest
Ordinance. BARTON, supra note 26, at 41. As such, Congress not only expected but
mandated "religion, morality, and knowledge" in the schools. Id. Further,
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clergy being paid out of state coffers or clergy holding exclusive power
to perform marriages.45 The ultimate concern was that of religious
liberty; an established national religion would infringe upon the people's
natural right of religious liberty and create inequality of such liberty.46
The form of the First Amendment ultimately addressed the privileges
concern by denying Congress the power to establish a religion while also
preserving religious equality by protecting "the free exercise thereof.
4 1
B. The Lemon Test
While the Supreme Court has heard various Establishment
48Clause cases since the passage of the religion clauses, no detailed test
"[e]xtensive, almost natural, collaboration between Church and State may be seen
again and again in eighteenth-century America." ANASTAPLO, supra note 43, at 56.
45. HAMBURGER, supra note 41, at 90. Granting such privileges was also
viewed as a penalty of free exercise of religion, as dissenters who did not wish their
tax money to pay clergy had little choice in the matter. Id.
46. Id. at 96-98. Natural rights describe rights one would enjoy in the
hypothetical state of nature, posited most notably by Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, and John Locke. Id. at 98. In contrast, James Madison wanted to limit
the legislative power of civil government so that it had no jurisdiction over religion.
Id. at 100. For further reading on Madison's perspective, see generally James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 8 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295 (ca. June 20, 1785). Such desires stemmed from the
founders' fear of the Roman Catholic Church's doctrine that vests "total, absolute,
and irrevocable power in a single body," leaving no recourse to the people.
BARTON, supra note 26, at 26. Consequently, some states excluded from office
those who claimed allegiance to a "foreign power." Id. at 27.
47. See HAMBURGER, supra note 41, at 101.
48. See, e.g., Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (holding that
granting of tax exemption to church did not violate Establishment Clause); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that Board of Regent's prayer in New
York schools violated Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-
14 (1952) (deciding that program allowing for school absence for religious
observance did not violate First Amendment); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 211-12 (1948) (maintaining that First Amendment precluded religious classes
in public schools). While many more archaic cases exist, these cases are the most
relevant to the focus of this article. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947), the Board of Education authorized funding by resolution for the
transportation of students to both public and parochial schools. Everson, 330 U.S. at
3. The Supreme Court held this resolution was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 2. Specifically, the Court reasoned that while a strict wall of
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was officially established until Lemon v. Kurtzman.49 In Lemon, the
plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of Rhode Island's 1969 Salary
Supplement Act and Pennsylvania's 1968 Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act.50 The acts provided financial supplement and
authorization to contract with nonpublic school teachers who taught
secular subjects, respectively.5' The objective of these statutes was to
offset the rising salaries in public schools, which in turn threatened the
52quality of education in nonpublic elementary schools.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
found its statute to be in violation of the Establishment Clause, stating
that it fostered excessive entanglement between the government and
• • 53
religion. In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania dismissed plaintiffs' complaints for failure to
separation between religion and state and federal governments was intended by the
framers, New Jersey did not breach that wall, as the busing was provided
indiscriminately to all students. See id. at 17-18. It was because of this decision that
the Court began a new, divergent path, determining what the Court's new "religion
in general" meant and opening the door to evaluation of everything from government
tax policies to nativity scenes in public places. HITTINGER, supra note 43, at 164.
49. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
50. The plaintiffs were composed of citizens and taxpayers, as well as
organizations promoting the belief in separation of church and state. Id. at 608, 610-
11. The organizations were denied standing. Id. at 611. The plaintiffs asserted that
the statutes were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, the Due Process Clause, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 606.
For a discussion on notions of separation of church and state, see infra note 62.
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-607. Pursuant to the Rhode Island statute, a
teacher could be supplemented not more than fifteen percent of his or her current
annual salary, if he or she taught at a nonpublic school at which the average per-
pupil expenditure for secular education was less than that of State's public schools.
Id. at 607-608. The statute limits secular education to those subjects taught at the
State's public schools, using the same teaching materials. Id. at 608. Under the
Pennsylvania statute, the state Superintendent of Public Instruction could purchase
secular educational services from nonpublic schools by forming contracts as
authorized by the statute. Id. at 609. The State would then directly reimburse the
nonpublic school for actual expenditures on secular education. Id. Five million
dollars were spent annually under the statute. Id. at 610. The statute was initially
funded by a tax on horse and harness racing, then by tax revenue from the sale of
cigarettes. Id. at 610-11.
52. Id. at 607-13.
53. Id. at 609.
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state a claim.54  Both Appellate Courts affirmed the lower courts'
decisions.55
The United States Supreme Court found that both statutes
violated the Establishment Clause.56 In analyzing the cases, the Court
created a three-prong test, each prong derived from previous case
precedent.57 First, the Court stated that the statute at bar must serve a
secular legislative purpose. 8 Second, the primary effect of the statute
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 9 Finally, the
60
statute must not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Under the
first two prongs, the Court reasoned that nothing in either statute's
legislative history evidenced a legislative intent to advance religion, as
the statutes themselves clearly stated that they were intended to enhance
the quality of secular education in all schools. 6 ' However, the Court
found that the statutes involved excessive entanglement between the
62government and religion.
54. Id. at 611.
55. Id. at 609, 611.
56. Id. at 625.
57. Id. at 612-13. The Court claimed that its test used "cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years." Id. at 612. However, the Court relied
almost exclusively upon two cases from 1968 and 1970, respectively. See infra
notes 58 and 60 for a discussion of each of these cases.
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The Court derived this prong from Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). In Allen, the Court found that a New
York statute requiring the school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to
parochial, as well as public and private schools, was constitutional because the
statute had the secular legislative purpose of providing educational opportunities to
children. Id. at 243.
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. This prong was derived from Allen, 392 U.S. at
243. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 58.
60. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Court gleaned this prong from Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). In Walz, the Court held that a New York
City ordinance giving tax exemptions to religious organizations using property for
religious worship was constitutional because it did not require continuing
surveillance by or more than a minimal nexus with the government to ensure the tax
exemption was properly granted. Id. at 675-76.
61. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Court addresses each of these two prongs
jointly and convolutedly in one paragraph. See id.
62. Id. at 614. The Court was quick to point out that total separation between
church and state was not necessary, as it is not possible in the absolute sense. Id.
However, the goal is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion
In determining excessive entanglement, the Court looked at the
character and purpose of the institutions that benefited from the statutes,
the nature of the aid provided, and the resulting relationship between the
religious institution and the government. 63 For the Rhode Island statute,
the Court found that the benefiting schools were near churches and were
64
supervised by the Bishop of Providence, Rhode Island. The schools
contained religious symbols such as crosses and crucifixes, and were
governed by an employee's handbook that had the force of synodal
law. 6' Further, two-thirds of the teachers were nuns, who the Court
believed could not maintain religious neutrality effectively while
66
administering secular duties. As such, the state was required under the
or state] into the precincts of the other." Id. The wall of separation doctrine to
which the Court referred is a byproduct of concern in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries of the power of the church, particularly the Catholic Church, with its
ecclesiastical power. HAMBURGER, supra note 41, at 480-81. This notion of
separation of church and state is derived from a letter from President Thomas Jefferson
to the Danbury Baptist Association, penned in 1802, which states "I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and
State." BARTON, supra note 26, at 45-46. Jefferson borrowed this notion from Roger
Williams, who used the metaphor to defend the integrity of religion in 1644, arguing that:
when [the faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ]
have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between
the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God
hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick,
and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day.
LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 184 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing
Roger Williams, A Letter of Mr. John Cottons (1643), in THE COMPLETE WRrrINGS OF
ROGER WLLIAMS (1963)). Thus, thirteen years after the adoption of the religion clauses,
President Jefferson redefined the term to mean something different than was intended,
changing an opening of the wall between church and state to maintaining of a wall. As
such, "the constitutional authority for separation is without historical foundation" and
undermines religious freedom. HAMBURGER, supra note 41, at 481,483.
63. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
64. Id. at 615, 617.
65. Id. at615,618.
66. See id. at 615. Several teachers testified that they "did not inject religion
into their secular classes." Id. at 618. However, the Court reasoned that because
"[t]he teacher is employed by a religious organization, subject to the direction and
discipline of religious authorities," such teachers "would find it hard to make a
total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine." Id. at 618-19.
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statute to provide continuous surveillance of the schools in order to
67
ensure that the money provided was going to secular education.
Additionally, the statute required that in nonpublic schools where
average per-pupil expenditures equaled or exceeded that of public
schools, the state would evaluate the percentage of total expenditures that
covered secular education compared to the percentage that covered
68
religious teaching. Because of this degree of mandated state oversight,
the Court found that the statute required excessive entanglement. 69 As• • 70
such, the Court held the statute unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Court found that the Pennsylvania statute required
excessive entanglement, because the benefiting schools were controlled
by religious organizations, had the purpose of propagating and promoting
a particular religious faith, and conducted their operations to fulfill that71
purpose. Further, the statute provided money directly to the schools,
rather than to the students or their parents.72  This direct interaction
between the government and religious schools mandated too much
• 73
interaction and involvement. Therefore, the Court held that plaintiffs
Ultimately, the Court was worried that "the potential for impermissible fostering of
religion [was] present." Id. at 619.
67. Id. at 619. The Court reasoned that a teacher would need constant
supervision to ensure that the teacher is honoring the secular purpose requirement of
the statute.
68. Id. at 620.
69. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]his kind of state inspection and
evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Because the Pennsylvania case had been dismissed for failure to state a
claim, the Court asserted that the complaint's allegations must be accepted as true
for purposes of the Court's review. Id.
72. Id. at 621. If the money had gone to the student or his or her parents, the
entanglement between government and religion would be less substantial. See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (giving significance to the fact
that the vouchers were given to parents, who in turn selected a school for their
children); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
73. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22.
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had a cause of action, as the evidence could demonstrate that the statute
created excessive entanglement.
74
The concurrence, penned by Justice Douglas, sought to bolster
the majority's holding by citing Madison's Third Remonstrance, 75 which
states that tax measures supporting religious activities "will destroy that
moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to
intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.,
76
Such "intermeddling," or "entanglement," the concurring justices opined,
violated the Establishment Clause.77
C. Judicial Use of the Lemon Test
Since Lemon, the Supreme Court has handed down many
Establishment Clause decisions,78 and the results have been arbitrary and
74. Id. at 625. The Court went on, emphasizing that while parochial schools'
financial needs may become a political issue that states might be interested in
funding, it is precisely the political division along religious lines that the Religion
Clauses were trying to avoid. Id. at 622.
75. Id. at 633-34 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 634. Madison's Third Remonstrance was penned in 1785, well after
the passage of the Bill of Rights. See supra note 46.
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002)
(holding that scholarship program offering funding for a choice of private or public
school education did not violate the Establishment Clause); Tangipahoa Parish Bd.
of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1251 (2000) (denying certiorari to appeal from
order enjoining school from reading a disclaimer before teaching evolution);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (overruling prior decision that using
federally funded teachers in religious schools to educate the disadvantaged violated
the Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1993) (deciding that a group should not be denied
access to show a film on unoccupied school property because of its religious
viewpoint); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620-21 (1988) (holding that federal
grants did not have to be withheld from an adolescent sexuality and pregnancy
services program because of a religious connection); Edwards v. Aguillard,, 482
U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (affirming lower court holding that the Louisiana
Creationism Act violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
61 (1985) (holding that Alabama statutes allowing prayer in schools violated the
Establishment Clause by suggesting state approval of such); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that city's display of a creche did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983) (deciding
that the employment of a chaplain to open state legislature sessions did not violate
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inconsistent. For example, the following two fact scenarios came before
the Court on two separate occasions.79 In the first instance, a city
displayed a creche, or nativity scene, in a city park in the city's shopping
district.8s This scene was part of the city's annual Christmas display to
celebrate the Christmas season, which includes Santa Claus, a Christmas
the Establishment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-402 (1983) (holding
that a tax deduction offered on elementary and secondary school expenses that was
also available to parents of parochial school students was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 454 U.S. 1140, 1140 (1982)
(noting probable jurisdiction for Court of Appeals decision that a statute allowing a
church to prevent the granting of nearby alcoholic beverage license was
unconstitutional); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) (holding that
Establishment Clause did not require prohibiting a student religious group from
meeting in university buildings); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980)
(holding that a statute which required the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public classrooms was unconstitutional); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980) (affirming lower court decision that
statutory reimbursement for private schools' performance of state-mandated testing
was constitutional); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977)
(holding a statute that allowed for fixed payments to private schools to pay for
required services violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (deciding that a state's provision of books and
supplies to private schools was constitutional, while field trip services were not);
Roemer v. Md. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760-61 (1976) (affirming lower
court decision that state grants to private colleges with screening processes did not
violate Establishment Clause); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1975)
(holding that loaning of textbooks to private schools was constitutional, but
providing auxiliary services violated the Establishment Clause); Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973) (holding that Pennsylvania act which provided
reimbursement to parents whose children attended nonpublic schools violated the
Establishment Clause); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (holding that New York's establishment of financial aid grants
and reimbursements for nonpublic schools was unconstitutional); Levitt v. Comm'n
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (deciding that lump
sum reimbursement to private schools for required services violated the
Establishment Clause); Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 808, 808 (1972) (noting
probable jurisdiction for decision that the reimbursement of partial tuitions for
private schools violated the Establishment Clause); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 688 (1971) (holding that grants given to public and private schools under the
Higher Education Facilities Act did not violate the Establishment Clause).
79. See sources cited infra notes 85 and 88.
80. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
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,,81tree, and a banner saying "Season's Greetings. While the lower courts
found that the creche violated the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
82Court found that it did not violate that clause. Specifically, the Court
stated that the scene satisfied the Lemon test in that it served a secular
purpose, was sufficiently neutral, and did not result in excessive
83 84government entanglement." As such, the display was constitutional.
In the second instance, a city displayed a creche on the staircase
of the county courthouse as part of the county's annual Christmas carol
program with an angel and a banner stating "Gloria in Excelsis Deo.
85
The lower court found the scene to be constitutional, but both the
appellate court and the Supreme Court found that it impermissibly
violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christianity with the
angel's religious statement because it did not have anything else to
86detract from that message. As such, the creche was not sufficiently
neutral to satisfy the Lemon test.87 These two decisions establish the
arbitrary and counterintuitive standard that religious displays are
constitutionally permissible only if they are accompanied by other
displays to detract from the religious display's message, a standard
which was short-lived.88
The Court further confounded Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by determining that the Lemon test did not apply to all
Establishment Clause challenges and by applying new, alternative
standards to such challenges. 89 In 1989, the Supreme Court decided
81. Id.
82. Id. at 671-72.
83. Id. at 685.
84. Id. at 687.
85. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S 573, 580-81 (1989). Also
challenged was a menorah placed outside a government building alongside a
Christmas tree and a "sign saluting liberty." Id. at 578. The Court found that
challenge constitutional under Lynch. Id. at 621.
86. Id. at 578-79, 588-89.
87. Id. at 599-600.
88. See McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (holding that despite
the Ten Commandments being part of a larger display of historical documents, it was
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (holding that a six by three foot monument, one of
seventeen on a twenty-one acre property, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (declining to apply
Lemon because of the pervasive government involvement with religion); Allegheny,
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County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.90 In Allegheny, 91
Justice O'Connor, casting the deciding vote, articulated a new test to
clarify the Lemon test-the "reasonable observer" test. 92 This new test
states that if a reasonable observer would believe that the government's
actions are endorsing or disapproving of religion, such an act isS • 93
unconstitutional. Because it was a plurality decision, it did not overturn
Lemon.94 Since that decision, only Justice O'Connor has consistently
adhered to the reasonable observer test.95
In similar fashion in 1992, Justice Kennedy laid out a third test
to function as the threshold analysis for the Lemon test-the "coercion
test.",96  This test focuses on the preliminary matter of whether the
government coerces a citizen to support or participate in religion or its
492 U.S. at 628-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (promoting the employment of a
modified Lemon test).
90. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
91. In Allegheny, a creche placed in the county courthouse was challenged as
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 579-80. A divided
plurality agreed. Id. at 577-78.
92. Id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 631.
94. Id. at 621 (stating that the lower court could consider, on remand, whether
the display of the menorah violated the "purpose" or "entanglement" prongs of the
Lemon test).
95. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 141 (2001)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting Justice O'Connor's support of the reasonable
observer test); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (applying the reasonable observer analysis); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 848 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(using the reasonable observer test in the context of the neutrality principle); Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (using the reasonable observer analysis to argue that the government
should avoid appearing to endorse religion). No direct mention of this standard is
mentioned in her concurrence in McCreary or in her dissent in Van Orden.
96. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In Lee, a middle school in
Rhode Island invited a rabbi to offer prayers at the 1989 graduation exercises. Id. at
581. The father of a student, Daniel Weisman, brought a claim against the school,
claiming an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 584. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the school should be enjoined from
prayers at future high school graduations because the government involvement in the
situation was both pervasive and divisive, and the students had no choice but to be
pressured into respectful silence for the prayer. Id. at 587-88, 593.
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exercise.97 Again, this new test did not reexamine or overrule Lemon;
consequently, Lemon continued to be good law. 98 Thus, the Supreme
Court now employs three tests: two derived from Lemon, and each
employed arbitrarily. 99
D. The McCreary Plurality and the Van Orden Dissent: the Court's Nod
To Lemon
In 2005, the Court decided Van Orden v. Perry0 0 and McCreary
v. ACLU. 10  The Van Orden case involved a six foot by three foot
monolith donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles' °2 to be placed outside
97. Id. at 587, 592. Such a test has the effect of reorienting the analysis to
individuals, thereby privatizing religion and making the test more relevant to free
exercise analysis. See supra text accompanying note 21.
98. Justice Kennedy stated in Lee that, because the initial threshold issue of
coercion would suffice to address the constitutionality of the issue at bar,
reevaluation of Lemon was not necessary. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
99. Carole K. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent
Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621, 634 (1995) ("The Court
has been unable to apply the test in a consistent fashion") (citing Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 21-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Some have
argued that this inconsistency, rather than any inherent problems within the test
itself, is the source of the problem. See id. Others have argued that regardless of
which of the three tests are used, the reasoning found in them is "almost entirely
extralegal," having "little to do with the technical apparatus of law and legal
interpretation." HITrlNGER, supra note 43, at 166. All of these tests, it is alleged,
are extremely skeptical, if not outright hostile, to religion, declaring it to be divisive,
coercive, and irrational, and redefines religion as whatever an individual wants it to
mean. Id. at 164-68. Such an approach to the law is merely a byproduct of
postmodernism, which advocates social constructivism and rejects or undermines the
value of reason. GENE EDWARD VEITH, JR., POSTMODERN TIMES: A CHRISTIAN
GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AND CULTURE 158 (1994). For a discussion of
the tenets of postmodemism, see id at 158-59.
100. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
101. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
102. At the bottom of the monolith was the following inscription:
"PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND YOUTH OF TEXAS BY THE
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF TEXAS 1961." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at
681-82. How a gift from a private organization to the state government constitutes
"a law" under the First Amendment so as to trigger the application of the
Establishment Clause is not explained in the decision and is troubling.
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the Texas State Capitol.' °3 Inscribed on the monument was the text of
the Ten Commandments. 104 The monument was one of seventeen such
monuments placed in the twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas State
Capitol.' '5
Forty years after the monument was erected, Thomas Van Orden
challenged its existence as a violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. In particular, Mr. Van Orden, as a practicing
lawyer, encountered the monolith during his frequent visits to the State
Capitol to use the law library and sued various state officials because he
believed it offended the Establishment Clause.
10 6
The District Court disagreed and upheld the monument as
constitutional. °7  The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
103. Id.
104. The text read as follows:
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his
manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything
that is thy neighbor's.
Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Other monuments included "Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade,
Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy,
Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard . . . Tribute to Texas School
Children, Texas Pioneer Woman, The Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl
Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled
Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers." Id. at 681 n.1 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 682.
107. Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26709,
at *20 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002). In light of the disarray of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the district court analyzed the monument with both the Lemon test as
well as O'Connor's reasonable observer standard. Id. at *12-*18.
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findings regarding the purpose and effect of the monument. 0 8  The
Supreme Court likewise affirmed. 10 9 In a plurality decision crafted by
the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that because the
monument was a passive acknowledgement of our nation's religious
roots, it did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.11° The Court
contrasted the monument with displays seen every day in school, arguing
that unlike school displays that students are faced with every day, the
Texas monolith was much more passive." I Thus, unlike school displays,
which the Court had found unconstitutional,' 12 the Texas monument did
not violate the Establishment Clause." 
3
Unlike Van Orden, McCreary dealt not with a monument but
rather an indoor courthouse display of nine documents, 1 4 one of which
was the Decalogue."I5 The American Civil Liberties Union challenged
108. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003).
109. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683.
110. Id. at 686. The relevance of passivity to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is not clear. In addition to the plurality supporting this new passivity
exception, Justice Breyer advances his own approach. In his concurrence, Justice
Breyer argues that the purpose behind the Establishment Clause should be examined
to guarantee the greatest scope of protection of religious liberty for all. Id. at 698.
(Breyer, J., concurring). He further argues that tests such as neutrality are
insufficient. Id. at 699-700. See infra text accompanying notes 138-175.
111. Id. at691.
112. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (holding that a state
statute requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in classrooms was
unconstitutional).
113. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92.
114. As in Van Orden, McCreary did not deal with a law as is apparently
required under the First Amendment. The Court makes no effort to explain why the
Establishment Clause is triggered in this situation.
115. McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). Initially, the two counties
involved-Pulaski and McCreary-posted the Ten Commandments alone in their
respective courthouses. Id. at 850. When those displays were challenged, the
counties "adopted a resolution calling for a more extensive exhibit meant to show
that the Commandments [were] Kentucky's 'precedent legal code."' Id. This was
implemented by supplementing the display with eight other religiously-themed
documents in smaller frames. Id. at 853. When McCreary County lost a suit
challenging the displays, the county changed the displays in light of the District
court's holding that the second display did not have a clearly secular purpose
because the documents that surrounded the Ten Commandments were only those
foundational documents that referred specifically to Christianity. ACLU v.
McCreary, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 687 (E.D. Ky. 2000). The counties replaced the
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the display as unconstitutional, and the District Court agreed.'
1 6
Specifically, the court found that the display had a primarily religious
purpose, and that, as such, it was unconstitutional.I17  On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the display's purpose was not
educational, but religious in nature."8 A majority of the Supreme Court,
looking to the purpose of the display, agreed with the Court of Appeals,
finding that because the display's purpose was not predominantly
secular, 19 it violated the Establishment Clause.
1 20
Although not explicit in doing so, several members of the Court
dissenting in Van Orden and penning McCreary reasserted the validity of
Lemon's first two prongs. Specifically, Justices Stevens, with whom
Justice Ginsburg dissents in Van Orden, and Justice Souter, in his
majority opinion in McCreary and separate dissent in Van Orden,
reaffirm the use of neutrality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens directly advocates the use of the neutrality principle,
arguing that the test is acknowledged in a substantial number of theS •• 121
Court's decisions and that the monument does not satisfy the test,
display with nine framed documents of equal size and various historical import,
including the Magna Carta, the lyrics to the Star Spangled Banner, and the
Declaration of Independence. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855-56.
116. ACLU v. McCreary, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
117. Id. at 848. Despite the counties' attempts to comply with the
requirements of Lemon by establishing a secular purpose for their display, the court
used the display changes against the counties to find the purpose for the display to be
religious. Id. at 849-50.
118. ACLU v. McCreary, 354 F.3d 438, 455 (6th Cir. 2003). Of significance
to the Sixth Circuit was the history of the case and the fact that the counties had
erected three different displays. Id. at 457. However, the dissent asserted that prior
displays should have no bearing on whether the current display was constitutional.
Id. at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
119. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864. Not only must a display have a secular
purpose, that secular purpose must not be secondary to a religious one. Id.
120. Id. at 881. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor expresses a concern that
the government is associating "one set of religious beliefs with the state" because
she believes doing so "identifies nonadherents as outsiders [and] encroaches upon
the individual's decision about whether and how to worship." Id. at 883 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Ironically, by requiring a primarily secular purpose for a religious
display, the religious individuals become the very outsiders she is trying to protect.
See infra notes 175-220 and accompanying text.
121. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709, 733 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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instead demonstrating a preference for religion over irreligion. 122 Justice
Souter also reasserted the validity of neutrality analysis in his opinion in
McCreary, although he did not apply any neutrality analysis directly.
123
Likewise, Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice
Ginsburg dissented in Van Orden and who drafted the majority opinion
in McCreary, not only insisted on a secular purpose to drive the
government's interest in establishing a monument or display,12' but
required that the predominant purpose for Establishment Clause
challenges be secular to survive constitutional scrutiny.12 In his opinion,
Justice Souter disregarded the county's attempts to satisfy the secular
purpose prong, finding its attempts to broaden the display to have a
general, educational purpose insufficient and inadequate to support a
secular purpose. 126 Likewise in his dissent in Van Orden, Justice Souter
discredited the seventeen other monuments surrounding the monolith in
question, arguing that the apparent secular circumstance does not save
the display. 127
Unfortunately, both of these standards-the secular purpose and
the neutrality principles-are internally inconsistent and offer little in the
way of a clear standard by which the government, be it federal or state,
can operate. As both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas rightly note in
their respective concurrences in Van Orden, the Court needs to establish
a consistent guidepost for what constitutes a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 128 Yet as the Court has demonstrated in the Van
122. Id. at 733-34.
123. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874-78. The discussion of neutrality may have
been included to accommodate Justice Stevens, who is a member of the majority.
124. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting); McCreary, 545 U.S.
at 864.
125. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 865.
126. Id. at 869-74.
127. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 742 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 692-93 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). See, e.g., Tangipahoa
Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-
49 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I am not ready to abandon all aspects of the
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Orden and McCreary decisions, the Lemon test will continue to be
employed.129 However, as this Article will now show, the Lemon test
should be discarded.
II. INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES IN CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
[The Lemon test has no more grounding in the
history of the First Amendment than does the wall
theory upon which it rests.' 
30
While the majority of the Supreme Court seems hesitant to
overrule the Lemon test, close inspection of its principles and the
consequences flowing out of it demand precisely that. To that end, this
Part will demonstrate the need to reject Lemon's secular purpose and
neutrality tests. Section A will address the logical, historical, and legal
problems that the tests' requirements create.' Section B will evaluate
the adverse consequences of using Lemon as the Establishment Clause
standard of review.'
32
Lemon test. I do believe, however, that the standards announced in Lemon should be
reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in achieving the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment.").
129. Alan R. Gries, Note, New York State School Board Association v. Sobol:
A Commendable Attempt to Apply Confusing Establishment Clause Standards, 38
VILL. L. REV. 759, 790 n.176 (1993). The Lemon test is typically used by those who
adhere to a strict separationist approach. Jeremy T. Bunnow, Note, Reinventing the
Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the Changing Nature of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1998). See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (holding that a special
school district designed around a religious village violated the Establishment
Clause). For recent uses of the Lemon test, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 662-63 (2002); Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1251
(2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-17 (2000); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
130. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For a discussion on the wall of separation doctrine, see supra note 62.
131. See infra notes 134-220 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
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A. Problems with the Lemon Test
Whenever words are understood in a sense different
from that which they had when introduced ...
mistakes may be very injurious.133
The Lemon test lays out three prongs, two of which the Court
continues to use to determine whether the law at bar violates the
Establishment Clause. Each of these two prongs has fatal flaws that
undermine both the purpose of the test and the intent of the
Establishment Clause, making the test internally inconsistent and
erroneous. This Section will address each prong in turn.134
1. The Fiction of Neutrality
Underlying the Court's analysis in McCreary and the dissent's in
Van Orden is an express adherence to the neutrality principle advanced
in Lemon. The second prong of the Lemon test, the neutrality principle,
requires that the law in question be neutral towards religion, neither
advocating nor prohibiting religion.135 In McCreary, the majority of the
Court, while using the neutrality test, concedes that "neutrality alone
cannot possibly lay every issue to rest . . ,,136 However, the Court
advances the test as reasonable, arguing that neutrality is what the
framers of the provision had in mind when the Bill of Rights was
passed. 137 Likewise, Justice Stevens, joined in his dissent in Van Orden
by Justice Ginsburg, argues that "[t]he basis for [neutrality] is firmly
rooted in our Nation's history and our Constitution's text," although "the
133. BARTON, supra note 26, at 22 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, THE HOLY BIBLE
... WITH AMENDMENTS OF THE LANGUAGE iii (Durrie & Peck 1833)).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 135-72 for a discussion of the
neutrality requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 173-220 for analysis of
the secular purpose requirement.
135. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-16 (1971).
136. McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005).
137. Id.
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requirement that government must remain neutral between religion and
irreligion would have seemed foreign to some of the Framers ... 138
Such a principle, however, even if it were part of the framers' intent,139 is
quite impossible to satisfy, both pragmatically and conceptually.
First, as a theoretical matter, the notion of neutrality is a
fiction. 14 Every law the government passes advances one interest to the
exclusion of another interest. For example, a speed limit on a state
highway advances safety over and above individual freedom to travel at
any speed the driver's conscience dictates. Likewise, a law prohibiting
robbery subverts the strength of the more powerful to protect weaker
individuals and their property rights. The middle ground that the Court
seeks simply is not there.'
4 1
The Court concedes as much in its free speech and equal
protection jurisprudence. When reviewing free speech claims, the Court
employs a strict scrutiny standard. This standard requires the
government to show that, although it is restricting speech, the
government has a compelling interest for doing so and has narrowly
tailored the law to serve that interest and nothing more. 142 Likewise, in
equal protection cases, the Court, depending upon the classification of
138. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 733-34 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens continues on to say that "[flortunately, we are not bound
by the Framers' expectations-we are bound by the legal principles they enshrined
in our Constitution." Id. at 734. Relying on Justice Story, Justice Stevens asserts
that underlying Justice "Story's vision that States should not discriminate between
Christian sects has as its foundation the principle that government must remain
neutral between valid systems of belief." Id. But see JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 988 (Carolina
Univ. Press 1987) (1851) ("An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter
of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal
disapprobation, if not universal indignation.").
139. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
140. The closest any society can come to being completely neutral is to be
"pluralistic in character, allowing many different and contending voices to be
represented in public discourse." McConnell, supra note 18, at 21.
141. See ALBERT M. WOLTERS, CREATION REGAINED: BIBLICAL BASICS FOR A
REFORMATIONAL WORLDVIEW 67 (2005).
142. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002)
(describing and applying strict scrutiny); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1982) (requiring a compelling state interest that is tailored to avoid
overinclusiveness).
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the individual whose rights have been violated, uses one of three tests:
the strict scrutiny standard,' 43 the intermediate scrutiny standard,1 or the
rational basis test. 45  When imposing any of these standards of review,
whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis, the Court
recognizes that the government had an interest in mind when it passed
the law in question.
That interest is never neutral. Governments pass laws to protect146• 14714
children, 146 to prevent campaign corruption, to promote justice. 148 All
such interests are advanced to the exclusion of another. In protecting
children, the government does not allow adults free access to any and allS149
pornography. In seeking to prevent corruption, the government does
not allow unregulated campaign contributions. 150 The government is not
and cannot be neutral-it always has a position. When the Court does
demand neutrality in the free speech context, it only demands viewpoint
neutrality, rather than complete neutrality."' And yet the Court, even in
143. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that "[s]uch
classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny"); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that when laws restrict the rights of a racial
group, the "courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny").
144. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
145. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
146. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) ("Congress
may pass valid laws to protect children from abuse, and it has.. ").
147. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) ("The contribution ceilings
thus serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the
electoral process .... ").
148. See Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) ("[T]he
ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or check identification in the
absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes
and bringing offenders to justice") (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
229 (1985)).
149. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240.
150. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
151. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) ("The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or the perspective of the speaker is a rationale for
the restriction"). Ironically, the secular purpose test, discussed below in Part II.A.2,
would likely fail even this narrow requirement because, as is demonstrated below,
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recognizing the government's inherently biased position in other aspects
of its constitutional jurisprudence, insists that it be neutral when religious
issues are before it. Inevitably, the government will fail unless it can
demonstrate that the interest at stake is secular, not religious, to the
satisfaction of the Court-a position the Court believes preserves
neutrality, when in fact it does not.
5 2
In addition to governments having partial interests in passing
laws, laws themselves are inherently moral in nature. 153  They will
inevitably promote some religious standard, be that Christian, Jewish,
Islamic, or secular. 154 Even laws that do not overtly demonstrate such an
underlying standard or worldview 55 still have morality at their root. For
example, all states have a law prohibiting murder. 56  Such laws are
motivated by a host of reasons, not the least of which is the notion of
preserving life.' 57 But why value life? The notion of human worth can
be found in various religious sources, 158 ranging from notions of dignity
given to humanity by God159 to the right of every person to become
the test discriminates among religions by using secularism as a guidepost for passing
constitutional muster. See infra text accompanying notes 173-220.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 173-220.
153. By deciding something is right or wrong, legislatures inherently imbue
into law a moral aspect. ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, LAW AND LIBERTY 2 (1971).
154. See id. at 1 ("Every law on the statute books of every civil government is
either an example of enacted morality or it is procedural thereto.").
155. See infra note 200.
156. See U.S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 683 (1975). Such a law is characterized
as "malum in se," that is, "wrong in itself." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379
n.21 (1985).
157. For some, these laws are created to enforce religious commandments not
to kill. See RUSHDOONY, supra note 153, at 1.
158. Religion includes secular humanist, as well as other more traditional
religious traditions. See supra text accompanying notes 194-211.
159. See J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW 35 (2003);
RUSHDOONY, supra note 153, at 1 ("Laws against manslaughter and murder are
moral laws; they echo the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill"'). Budziszewski
argues that such notions of morality are ultimately rooted in natural law, a
philosophy which states, among other things, that within each human being is actual
knowledge of absolute right and wrong, regardless of whether such knowledge and
the source of such knowledge are acknowledged or ignored. See generally
RUSHDOONY, supra note 153.
completely realized.' 60 All such notions are moral principles upon which
such laws are created. 61 Even such discretionary laws 16 as speed limit
requirements are motivated by moral concerns of preserving life and
•• 163
protecting citizens. As such, the underpinnings of the law as moral are
clear. 64
Because of the law's inherent morality, it cannot be neutral
regarding religion. The law will always serve to advance one or more
religions, in some cases to the exclusion of another. 65 Thus, to assume
that a law can ever be neutral, as this prong insists, is erroneous, and
makes satisfying this prong impossible.
Second, as a practical matter, neutrality as required by this prong
is unattainable. Consider the following laws: "prayers may not be
offered in public schools;" "prayers may be offered in public schools."
If a law must be neither for nor against religion, which of these laws
could stand? For presumably, on the one hand, a law that permits prayer
in schools is most assuredly advancing religion, and thus in violation of
this prong. 66 On the other hand, a law that prohibits prayer is quite
obviously prohibiting religion and should similarly be in violation of this167
prong. What, then, is the school, in this context, or state or federal
160. See Humanist Manifesto I, http://www.americanhumanist.org/about/
manifesto l.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
161. The fundamental dispute is the source of that morality.
162. These laws are categorized as "malum prohibitum"-not naturally or
inherently wrong in and of themselves, but still illegal. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 379 n.21 (1985).
163. See RUSHDOONY, supra note 153, at 1 ("Traffic laws are moral laws also:
their purpose is to protect life and property.").
164. Such notions were understood to the framers: "The transcendent values of
Biblical natural law were the foundation of the American republic." BARTON, supra
note 26, at 336.
165. This assumes that another religion exists that has tenets that are contrary
to another religion's regarding the specific law in question. If not, the law will
advance religion without having a prohibitive effect.
166. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (explaining that
government aid must be "made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries
on a nondiscriminatory basis").
167. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 195, 197 (1992) (stating that a bar on government involvement with traditional
religions affirmatively establishes a secular establishment). See infra text
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government, in other similar situations, to do to prevent a Constitutional
violation? The result is to place government in the position of, by
necessity, violating the law.
Such a Catch 22 effect has further problems under the neutrality
test because, while a law might be facially neutral, its effect might not be
neutral. If, for example, the federal government decides that, because it
cannot afford to provide money for all schools in a non-discriminatory
manner, it will provide money for no schools, the government is, in
effect, prohibiting religion. By not funding schools, well-established and
well-funded religious groups would take up the task and would advance
themselves, while fledging religions with fewer resources would lose
their voice in the public square. 68 Thus, by an act of omission, the
government can still violate the purpose of this prong. Such an outcome
is pragmatically unsound and places the government in a position where
it cannot constitutionally achieve any of its objectives while satisfying
this requirement.
To avoid the situation described above, the Court has modified
the definition of neutrality on a case-by-case basis, letting some instances
of religious discrimination slide. 69 Such an ad hoc approach to a self-
created test is not only inappropriate, it makes the standard meaningless
and difficult to satisfy. Consequently, the second prong of this test is as
pragmatically problematic as it is both unattainable and unpredictable.
Finally, even if such a standard of neutrality were attainable, it is
excessively broad. Historically, the framers did not intend to subject the
government's involvement with religion to such close scrutiny. The
ultimate concern of the framers was with the establishment of an
imposed religion. 170 The framers wanted to preserve the citizen's natural
right to, and ensure equality of, religious liberty.171 Such preservation
accompanying notes 194-211 for a discussion of why secular humanism constitutes a
religion.
168. The demise of a religion is outside the scope of the Establishment Clause,
but because of the neutrality requirement, the Supreme Court appears to have
assumed the paternal role of overseeing the proliferation of all religions or none.
169. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 731 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court's alleged neutrality analysis modifies the analysis
to considering the degree of the offense against religion).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
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was not intended to prevent support for religion, or to create prohibitions
on religion, but rather was designed to ensure that the experience in
England of an established church was not duplicated in the United
States. 72 The second prong of the Lemon test exceeds this intent by
requiring that the government neither advance nor inhibit religion.
Thus, for conceptual, practical, and historical reasons, neutrality
as a standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not only
meaningless and unattainable, but unnecessarily broad in scope. As
such, it should not be used in Establishment Clause analysis.
2. Secular Purpose: Advancing Religion
for the Sake of Neutrality
In an attempt to advance its neutrality requirement, the Court
delineates another test, one that is typically considered first: whether the
law at issue serves a secular purpose. 73 As reiterated by Justice Souter,
"'Lemon's 'purpose' requirement aims at preventing [government] from
abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular
point of view in religious matters."", 74 Arguably, the test is designed to
prevent sending "the ...message to ...nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members .... ,175
While historically this test has required government to
demonstrate a secular purpose, 176 McCreary propounds a more stringent
test: the primary purpose must be secular. 77 Although the McCreary
plurality asserts that the secular purpose test "alone may rarely be
172. See supra text accompanying note 41.
173. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
174. McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335 (1987)).
175. Id. at 860 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000)).
176. See, e.g.,Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
177. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864-65. But see City of Elkhart v. Books, 532
U.S. 1058, 1062 (2001) ("In determining whether a secular purpose exists, we have
simply required that the displays not be 'motivated wholly by religious
considerations."') (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).
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determinative," 178 it proceeds to rely almost exclusively upon this test to
determine the display at bar is unconstitutional. 79 However, by insisting
that religious practices and laws serve a secular purpose, the Court
effectively-and ironically, in light of their neutrality aspirations-
establishes secular humanism as a religion.
"Secular," as defined by Webster's Dictionary, means "of or
pertaining to worldly things or to things not regarded as sacred;
temporal"; "not relating to or concerned with religion . ,80
According to Webster's Dictionary, "religion" is defined as:
a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature and
purpose of the universe, especially when considered
as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies,
usually involving devotional and ritual observances,
and often containing a moral code for the conduct of
human affairs; . . . something a person believes in
and follows devotedly.18
The court, in employing the term "secular," cannot mean secular
in its definitional sense. If it did-that is, if it required laws to have
purposes that do not relate to religion-it would never find a law
constitutional because all laws are based upon a moral code, the
underpinnings of which are religious, whether Christian, Muslim, or
178. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859-60 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
179. Id. at 859-74.
180. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1212 (1995)
[Hereinafter Dictionary]. The problem with this definition is the assumption that
religion is but one aspect of a person's life. It divides human experience into
"religious" and "secular," with religious relating to church and worship, and secular
involving everything else, such as family, politics, business, art, and education.
WOLTERS, supra note 141, at 67-68. Such a distinction is false, however; for
religious persons, including secularists, religion informs all other areas of life,
including family, politics, business, art, and education. Id. at 68. All of these areas,
including church and worship, can be secular to the extent that they are done in an
irreligious manner. Id. This is ultimately a recharacterization of the two-kingdoms
theory. See supra note 42.
181. DICTIONARY, supra note 180, at 1138.
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ew182secular, to name but a few. However, the Court has and does find the
secular purpose prong to be satisfied.
183
It appears that, instead, the Court uses "secular purpose" to mean
any reason that does not refer to or rely on traditionally recognized
theistic religions. For example, the Court has recognized the secular
purpose of supporting education, 184 but does not recognize supporting
theistic religion in public schools. 185 The Court will permit teaching a
moral code in schools, 186 but it will not permit moral codes espousing a
creator. 87 The Court allows education to include evolution,' 88 but does• • 189
not support teaching creationism. The fact that these distinctions
coincide with secular humanist beliefs cannot be mere coincidence. 190
The Court, in employing this standard, is advocating and supporting
secular humanism. And in so doing, the Court establishes a religion.
Secular humanists "deny that morality needs to be deduced from
religious belief [in God] or that those who do not espouse a religious
doctrine are immoral."' 9' In other words, they create a morality and a set
of beliefs that are not God-based, but human-based. 
192
182. See supra text accompanying notes 154-167.
183. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2001) (holding that a
moment of quiet reflection in the wake of high-profile violence is a sufficient secular
purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (recognizing the Ten
Commandments, in part, as advancing a secular purpose of establishing moral
standards such as not lying, stealing, or honoring one's parents); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (holding that funding parochial schools
satisfies the government's secular purpose of education).
184. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
185. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 (1992).
186. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 43.
187. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 714-15 (2005).
188. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
189. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
190. See infra notes 194-195.
191. PAUL KURTZ, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMANISM 17 (1983). The central
tenet of secularism is the value of human happiness. Id.
192. Id. Such morality, secularists allege, is not necessarily antisocial,
subjective, or promiscuous, "nor need it lead to the breakdown of moral standards."
Id. Rather, secularists change the source of authority for morality from God to
humanity. This change begs the question: which human has the authority to lay out
morals that another must obey? The necessary outcome, contrary to the assertions
quoted above, is that morality is indeed subjective, each person for his or herself,
thereby undermining any universal standard that may exist or be recognized, and
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Because of this, secular humanism is by definition a religion.' 93
First, it adheres to a set of beliefs, namely, those things that conform to
secular morality. 94 Despite seeking to appear non-religious in nature,
historically, secular humanists have espoused a list of the basic tenets of
their beliefs in their 1933 Humanist Manifesto. 195 These tenets have
providing an inadequate and unpredictable basis upon which to establish a standard
of constitutional review.
193. See Secular Absolutism, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2004),
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/editorial/feature.html?id= 110004819 (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009) (discussing secular ideology as a potent religious force).
194. See Humanist Manifesto I, http://www.americanhumanist.org/about/
manifesto 1.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
195. Id. They are as follows:
FIRST: Religious humanists regard the universe as self-
existing and not created.
SECOND: Humanism believes that man is a part of nature
and that he has emerged as a result of a continuous process.
THIRD: Holding an organic view of life, humanists find that
the traditional dualism of mind and body must be rejected.
FOURTH: Humanism recognizes that man's religious culture
and civilization, as clearly depicted by anthropology and
history, are the product of a gradual development due to his
interaction with his natural environment and with his social
heritage. The individual born into a particular culture is
largely molded by that culture.
FIFTH: Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe
depicted by modem science makes unacceptable any
supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values.
Obviously humanism does not deny the possibility of
realities as yet undiscovered, but it does insist that the way to
determine the existence and value of any and all realities is
by means of intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their
relations to human needs. Religion must formulate its hopes
and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method.
SIXTH: We are convinced that the time has passed for
theism, deism, modernism, and the several varieties of "new
thought."
SEVENTH: Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and
experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human
is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science,
philosophy, love, friendship, recreation-all that is in its
degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living.
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The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no
longer be maintained.
EIGHTH: Religious humanism considers the complete
realization of human personality to be the end of man's life
and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and
now. This is the explanation of the humanist's social passion.
NINTH: In the place of the old attitudes involved in worship
and prayer the humanist finds his religious emotions
expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and in a
cooperative effort to promote social well-being.
TENTH: It follows that there will be no uniquely religious
emotions and attitudes of the kind hitherto associated with
belief in the supernatural.
ELEVENTH: Man will learn to face the crises of life in
terms of his knowledge of their naturalness and probability.
Reasonable and manly attitudes will be fostered by education
and supported by custom. We assume that humanism will
take the path of social and mental hygiene and discourage
sentimental and unreal hopes and wishful thinking.
TWELFTH: Believing that religion must work increasingly
for joy in living, religious humanists aim to foster the
creative in man and to encourage achievements that add to
the satisfactions of life.
THIRTEENTH: Religious humanism maintains that all
associations and institutions exist for the fulfillment of
human life. The intelligent evaluation, transformation,
control, and direction of such associations and institutions
with a view to the enhancement of human life is the purpose
and program of humanism. Certainly religious institutions,
their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and communal
activities must be reconstituted as rapidly as experience
allows, in order to function effectively in the modem world.
FOURTEENTH: The humanists are firmly convinced that
existing acquisitive and profit-motivated society has shown
itself to be inadequate and that a radical change in methods,
controls, and motives must be instituted. A socialized and
cooperative economic order must be established to the end
that the equitable distribution of the means of life be
possible. The goal of humanism is a free and universal
society in which people voluntarily and intelligently
cooperate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared
life in a shared world.
FIFTEENTH AND LAST: We assert that humanism will: (a)
affirm life rather than deny it; (b) seek to elicit the
possibilities of life, not flee from them; and (c) endeavor to
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been supplemented and explained further in the second' 96 and third
Humanist Manifestos, and in other writings. 19
Second, even though its morality is derived from a non-
traditional source-reason rather than God-secularism does contain a
moral code.' 99 As mentioned above, humanists espouse the basic tenets
of their beliefs-the Humanist Manifesto-in all its revisions.
Finally, it is a worldview that is believed in and adhered to just
as devotedly as any traditional religion.200 As such, secular humanism is
just as much a religion as are Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.
Secular humanists have supported this assertion. The first
Humanist Manifesto referred to humanism as a religion. 20' Likewise,
noted secular humanists such as John Dewey signed the first Humanist
Manifesto, which states that "[i]n order that religious humanism may be
better understood we, the undersigned, desire to make certain
affirmations which we believe the facts of our contemporary life
demonstrate. '20 2 Charles F. Potter, another signer of the first Humanist
Manifesto and a humanist in the early 1920s, drafted a book entitled
Humanism: A New Religion. Even more contemporary humanists like
Paul Kurtz have conceded as much, asserting that a large number of
establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not
merely for the few. By this positive morale and intention
humanism will be guided, and from this perspective and
alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.
Id.
196. Humanist Manifesto II, http://www.americanhumanist.org/about/
manifesto2.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
197. Humanist Manifesto III, http://www.americanhumanist.org/who_we_are/
abouthumanism/Humanist_Manifestojl (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
198. E.g., KURTZ, supra note 191.
199. See Council for Secular Humanism, What is Secular Humanism?,
http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=what (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
200. Id. Worldview is defined as "the comprehensive framework of one's
basic beliefs about things." WOLTERS, supra note 141, at 2. It is prescientific in that
it is an "inescapable component of all human knowing." Id. at 9; see generally
KURTZ, supra note 191 (laying out the ten tenets of secular humanism).
201. See Humanist Manifesto I, supra note 194.
202. Id.
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humanists "consider themselves to be religious ' ,,203 Secular
humanists recognize their role as one of replacing traditional religions,
which espouse a God, with a man-centered understanding of the world
around them. °
Even if secular humanism were not by definition a religion, the
Supreme Court has found it to be so for the purposes of First
Amendment analysis. In Torcaso v. Watkins 205 the Supreme Court stated
that "[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others. 206 In Welsh v.
207 0United States and Edwards v. Aguillard°8 the Court subsequently
confirmed that it had previously recognized secular humanism as a
209
religion.
Further, the Supreme Court has determined that what constitutes
religion under the Free Exercise Clause is "a sincerely held religious21021
belief." Belonging to a religious sect is not required. 2 1 This even
broader definition of religion encompasses secular humanism within its
purview, as secular humanism is a belief that is just as sincerely followed
212
as are traditional religious tenets. The argument that secular
humanism is not governed by an organized sect is irrelevant to the
213Court's analysis.
203. KURTZ, supra note 191, at 116 (explaining, however, that humanists
"mean something different by 'religion' from what the theist means").
204. See Council for Secular Humanism, What is Secular Humanism?, supra
note 199.
205. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
206. Id. at 495 n. 11 (citations omitted).
207. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
208. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
209. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 357 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring); Edwards, 482 U.S. at
624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)
(holding that disqualifying an employee from receiving unemployment benefits
because the employee refused to work in relation to his religious beliefs violated the
Free Exercise Clause).
211. Id.
212. See generally KURTZ, supra note 191 (laying out the ten tenets of secular
humanism).
213. See Frazee, 489 U.S at 832-33 ("none of those decisions turned on that
consideration or on any tenet of the sect involved that forbade the work the claimant
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Because secular humanism satisfies Free Exercise requirements
for religious status, it would be disingenuous to assert that it does not
hold such a status for Establishment Clause purposes. For the purposes
of legal analysis under either religion clause, secular humanism is a
religion. And under Establishment Clause jurisprudence, secular
purposes are as much religious purposes as are those traditionally
believed to be religious.21 4
Because secular humanism constitutes a religion under both
judicial and lay understandings of the term, the first prong's insistence
upon finding a "secular purpose" to justify a law is contrary to the
215purpose of the test, which allegedly is neutrality. By its own terms,
this prong advocates and endorses secular humanism, which is a religion.
Thus, rather than eradicating any religious bias in government by
ensuring that it "neither advances nor inhibits religion, ' 216 the secular
purpose requirement demands that the government have a religiously
secular justification for its laws. Rather than achieving any sort of
neutrality on the part of the government regarding religion, this prong
mandates religious advocacy, and only that of a particular variety.
Further, this test, in advocating a secular religious state, is doing
precisely what the Establishment Clause was designed to avoid.2 17 By
mandating that a particular religious standard be maintained, the
Supreme Court has effectively created a national religion to which the
-• 218
government, both federal and state, is subject. This resulting national
standard is exactly what the framers were attempting to prevent by
refused to perform. Our judgments in those cases rested on the fact that each of the
claimants had a sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain from the
work in question.").
214. This also demonstrates the Court's inconsistencies in analyzing the
Religion Clauses, as each clause is subject to a different definition of "religion." See
generally Vincent Phillip Munoz, Establishing Free Exercise, 138 FIRST THINGS,
Dec. 2003, at 14.
215. See Sch. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("The
State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe."').
216. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
218. See supra note 43 for discussion of the incorporation doctrine.
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creating the Establishment Clause. 219 Thus, not only does this prong
undermine the purpose of the Court in framing the test, it flagrantly
violates the premise of the Establishment Clause. 2  As such, it is an
inappropriate standard for Establishment Clause analysis.
B. Consequences of Using the Lemon Test
The real object of the [First A]mendment was not
to advance [] Mahometanism, or Judaism, or
infidelity, by prostrating Christianity ....
The results of using the neutrality and secular purpose tests for
Establishment Clause analysis are troubling. First, these requirements
have the effect of limiting religious freedom by denying religions
governmental support that can help them to flourish, and by imposing
compliance standards upon both religion and the government."' The
framers would not have countenanced such an outcome, as it is contrary
to the clause's intent.2 23
219. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
220. Even if secularism were not a religion, because all law is informed by
religious beliefs and governed by some moral code, no law would be able to actually
satisfy this prong. See supra text accompanying notes 156-68.
221. BARTON, supra note 26, at 31 (quoting JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Vol. III 728, §
1871). But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 728-29 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (alleging that "[t]he original understanding of the type of religion that
qualified for constitutional protection under the Establishment Clause likely did not
include those followers of Judaism and Islam . . . . The inclusion of Jews and
Muslims inside the category of constitutionally favored religions surely would have
shocked ... Justice Story.").
222. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580 (1989)
(requiring constitutional religious displays to surround themselves with other
displays from a different religion).
223. See supra text accompanying note 18. Further, the Lemon test denies
religion its role of reforming citizens. After all, it is not the role of the law, but
rather the role of religion, in whatever form it takes, to reform human beings.
RUSHDOONY, supra note 153, at 3. The checks and balances built into the United
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Second, the neutrality test promotes ad hoc decision-making,
which has never been appropriate in a legal system in which stare decisis
and consistency are valued. 4  The framers expected the legislative
history of the Bill of Rights to be considered when interpreting them,
225
analogizing the analysis to that of statutory interpretation. The use of
the Lemon test is contrary to such expectations, and does not sufficiently
provide the government with notice as to what is constitutional and
unconstitutional behavior under the Establishment Clause.
Likewise, the secular purpose requirement is arbitrarily enforced.
Under the secular purpose test, if two governments advanced a law, such
as "Murder is a crime"-in effect, the Sixth Commandment-then, that
law could be challenged under Establishment Clause grounds because
the purpose for the law is relevant.226 Under this prong, whether or not
that law would be deemed in violation of the Establishment Clause
would depend more upon the motives of the government passing the law
than upon the law itself. Thus, a government that decided to pass such a
law because it wanted to ensure greater tax revenue by protecting its
taxpayers would presumably be permitted to pass such a law. However, a
States Constitution demonstrate this notion, that humanity is inherently inclined
towards abuse of power and evil. McConnell, supra note 18, at 7.
224. See supra text accompanying note 1.
225. BARTON, supra note 26, at 21. For example, Jefferson, as President,
stated:
On every question of construction, carry ourselves back to
the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the
spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what
meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against
it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed.
Id. at 22. Similarly, Madison wrote:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the
nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.
And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no
security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithful,
exercise of its powers .... What a metamorphosis would be
produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology
were to be taken in its modem sense.
Id.
226. The fact that it has not been so challenged is likely because secular
humanists like the law and can advance a palatable secular reason for preserving the
law.
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government that viewed its citizens as image-bearers of God and, as
such, entitled to pursue "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for
that reason, or viewed murder as a contravention of God's moral law that
should be punished, would apparently not be able to propound such a law
constitutionally merely because their predominant reasons were not
secular.227
Such an outcome is not what the drafters had in mind. The
drafters wanted Americans to be free to believe and to be governed as
228their consciences dictated. But the secular purpose requirement has
exactly the opposite effect-it penalizes governments that pass laws
because they are motivated by religious beliefs and affirms those
governments that are comprised of a secular majority. It sends the
message that secular, non-religious reasons for passing a law are the only
acceptable justifications for that law and thereby violates the right of
conscience that the framers sought to protect.
229
Finally, Lemon's neutrality and secular purpose standards alter
the Constitution in an impermissible manner through judicial activism.
When framing the Constitution, "[t]he Founders made it clear that if the
meaning and application of any part of the Constitution was to be altered,
it had to be at the hands of the people-not at the feet of the Court. 230
However, the Court, by creating these standards, interprets the
Establishment Clause to create a greater separation between church and
231state than was ever intended. Such activism is an impermissible
usurpation of democratic power.
For all these reasons, considerations of neutrality and secular
purposes should be discarded as the standards for determining the
227. This is what the plurality in McCreary clearly countenances as a
legitimate outcome. See McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860-61 (2005)
("Indeed, the purpose apparent from government action can have an impact more
significant than the result expressly decreed: when the government maintains Sunday
closing laws, it advances religion only minimally because many working people
would take the day as one of rest regardless, but if the government justified its
decision with a stated desire for all Americans to honor Christ, the divisive thrust of
the official action would be inescapable.").
228. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
230. BARTON, supra note 26, at 33-34.
231. See supra note 62 and accompanying discussion.
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constitutional validity of government actions and laws regarding religion
under the Establishment Clause.
III. RETURNING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE TO ITS ROOTS
[W]here there is no law, there is no liberty; and
nothing deserves the name of law but that which is
certain and universal in its operation upon all the
members of the community.32
Clearly, the Court's neutrality and secular purpose principles go
233beyond the intent of the Establishment Clause. As Justice Thomas
points out, a more tenable, internally consistent standard that complies
with the framers' intent for the Establishment Clause should be used
instead.3
The Court should focus its analysis upon what the drafters meant
by prohibiting the government from establishing a religion. Because
"the forbidden 'establishment' does not refer to official cooperation with
religion but rather to official preference for one or a few religious sects at
the expense of all the others in the community, '' 235 the Court should
narrow its focus to reflect this intention. The Establishment Clause
should be applied in a manner that reflects the framers' interests in
preserving religious expression from governmental intrusion by
prohibiting official governmental preference of one religious belief to the
236
exclusion of others through its legislation and laws. The
Establishment Clause should be applied to only those circumstances
where the government has created a law that officially establishes a
religion, conveying benefits exclusive to those of that religious
232. BARTON, supra note 26, at 336 (quoting I Letters, Benjamin Rush to
David Ramsay, March or April 1788, at 454). Specifically, "America's immutable
principles of right and wrong were not based on the rapidly fluctuating feelings and
emotions of the people but rather on what Montesquieu identified as the 'principles
that do not change."' Id.
233. See supra notes 133-231 and accompanying text (analyzing the problems
the Lemon test presents).
234. The framers followed a two-kingdoms model in establishing the
Constitution. See supra note 42.
235. ANASTAPLO, supra note 43, at 56.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
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persuasion and denying those benefits to others because of their different
.. 237
religious perspective. No one's civil rights should vary because of
238their religious beliefs.
Having narrowed the Establishment Clause to its proper
purview, the question remains as to what to do with causes of action that
challenge provisions involving religious issues but do not rise to the level
of establishing a religion.239 Such actions include prayer in school,
teaching intelligent design in school, funding of and tax exemptions for
religious institutions, and even the displays challenged in McCreary and
Van Orden. What all of these issues have in common is that they all
pertain to speech. The Ten Commandments are speech. A nativity scene
is an expression of speech. Prayer in schools and teaching evolution or
intelligent design to students both involve speech. Whether governmental
speech occurs in the form of funding or tax exemptions or private speech
in created fora, all pertain to speech. The proper analysis for such issues,
rather than focusing on the Establishment Clause, should fall under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
As in any free speech challenge, the court considers who the
speaker is. 24 ° If it is the government, then the Court has held that
regardless of the viewpoint or content of the speech, the speech is okay
because the government is saying it.241 Thus, in the context of both
McCreary and Van Orden, the Ten Commandment displays might be
constitutional because the government is speaking by supporting a
document it believed had a place in that state's history. Likewise, the
curriculum of public schools is a reflection of the government's values
242and constitutes government speech.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
239. Some might argue that the Free Exercise Clause should govern such
actions. However, the Free Exercise Clause does not serve as a limitation upon
religious actions but instead, at least in theory, protects such actions. As such, it is
not a suitable candidate for challenging the constitutionality of religious activities.
240. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
241. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
229 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995).
242. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
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However, in those circumstances where the government is not
speaking, the Supreme Court has stated that the government may not
discriminate based upon viewpoint or the content of the speech
243
offered. If the government creates a forum in which anyone has an
opportunity to speak, such a forum cannot be regulated to prohibit certain
points of view.244 Thus, if the Ten Commandments in McCreary were the
result of the government opening the courthouse up to various displays, it
245
could not discriminate against one display based upon its ideology.
By shifting the focus of such challenges away from the
Establishment Clause and to free speech analysis where it rightfully
belongs, the Establishment Clause is appropriately narrowed and applied
only in those situations where the law demonstrates exclusive religious
adherence to the detriment of other religions.
CONCLUSION
If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history
of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to
apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use
in it.
246
As is demonstrated above, the Lemon test is both internally
inconsistent and incompatible with the framers' intent. Its arbitrariness,
overbreadth, and destructive effect on religion are contrary to the
purpose of the Establishment Clause. The byproduct of using such an ill-
formed test has been inconsistency and unpredictability. Because of this,
the test should be abandoned, archived as a brief anomaly in legal
history, and replaced with a narrower construction of the Establishment
Clause that reflects the framers' intent.
243. Id. at 834.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 829. The opinion offers only a preliminary look at free speech
forum analysis. For a more complete review, see Gregory S. Weber, Needling the
Thread: A Moderator's Guide to Freedom of Speech Limitations on Government
Sponsored Web-Based Threaded Discussions, 7 CoMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 323, 330-
38 (2004).
246. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Lemon test should be abandoned).
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